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INTRODUCTION	
  
Alex D.1 was bored and drifting as he sat in his English Literature
class one gray winter day. Looking to amuse himself, he did what many
teens do. He looked down at his cell phone to check for messages. Alex
knew he was violating a school rule that prohibited cell phone use during
class, but he figured he could get away with it. His teacher, however,
noticed Alex’s downward glances and recognized the telltale sign of
probable cell phone use. She promptly confronted him and confiscated
the phone.
The teacher was enforcing what has become a common policy in
many schools.2 When class was over, she took the phone to the main
office where it would be held until the end of the day.
On this particular day, however, things progressed a little
differently. The school principal took possession of the phone after it
was brought into the office. Acting upon general rumors of drug dealing
in the school, she opened Alex’s phone and started reading the stored
text messages. She found a very recent text message from “Brian” that

*

Professor of Law, University of New Hampshire School of Law. The author wishes to
thank Professors Kimberly Kirkland, Dana Remus, John Greabe, Chris Johnson, Risa
Evans, and Richard Albert for their ideas and feedback. In addition, the author extends
her appreciation to Research Assistants Lauren Breda, Nathan Warecki and Caroline
Schleh for the many hours of work they provided. The author thanks Roger Wellington
for his editing contributions, and Honorable Paul Barbadoro and Attorney David
Rothstein for their advice and feedback Finally, the author is grateful to “Brian”—now
a successful college student—who was willing to share his personal experience.
1 These facts are based on a true story.
2 Virginia Groark, Tired of Interruptions, Schools Ban Cell Phones, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9,
2001, at 14CN; Paul Lieberman, Parents Answer Cell Phone Ban in N.Y. Schools, L.A.
TIMES, May 29, 2006, at A4; Region in Brief, Cell Phones Now Banned in Hub’s Schools,
BOS. HERALD, Mar. 24, 2005, News at 33.
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read: “Yo, need a bag?”3 The principal, pretending to be Alex, responded
to the text: “yea I can wait at back door . . . I will hide out in a room and
look for u.”
Brian replied quickly and the principal, posing as Alex, began a
lengthy text conversation that culminated in an agreement to meet in a
nearby parking lot so “Alex” could purchase a bag of marijuana.4
Unaware of the ruse, Brian showed up at the parking lot, where he was
arrested by the police with the principal looking on.
The principal reported to the police that she routinely scrolled
through students’ confiscated phones and placed calls to numbers in the
contact list in an attempt to catch students using their phones in school.5
Although perhaps not as proactively as the principal of Alex’s school,
administrators are playing out similar scenarios all around the country.6
Given the potential for disruption and distraction, it is clearly reasonable
to enjoin student use of cell phones during instructional periods.
Confiscation of a cell phone is a logical consequence for violating the
rule. However, what school officials can lawfully do with a phone after
confiscation is not clear.
Over seventy-five percent of teenagers carry a cell phone on a
daily basis, and many use the device as a private diary and portal for
personal data and information.7 When the principal opened Alex’s phone
and began searching through his texts and information, she could have
stumbled upon a variety of personal information and images including
appointments with therapists or doctors, personal messages related to
3

Clare Trapasso, Teen Sues After Principal Lures Him into Alleged Drug Deal, UNION
LEADER, Apr. 18, 2008, at A6.
4 The case discussed here took place at a private school where administrators are
unconstrained by the Fourth Amendment. However, this type of scenario is routinely
played out in public schools.
5 Police report - on file with author.
6
High School Not Confidential: When Officials Search Student Cell Phones, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE, Feb. 5, 2012, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-0205/news/ct-edit-stevenson-20120205_1_school-searches-strip-search-stevenson-student;
Marc Freeman, Student Rights Group Targets Boca High Cellphone Searches, Sun
Sentinel, July 26, 2011, available at http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2011-0726/specialsection/fl-boca-high-cell-phone-complaint-20110725_1_student-cellphonesstudent-phones-high-school-student-handbook; Rick Rojas, School Phone Policies
Assessed, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2011, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/
12/local/la-me-cellphones-20111112; J.W. v. DeSoto County Sch. Dist., 2:09-CV00155-MPM, 2010 WL 4394059 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 1, 2010).
7 Amanda Lenhart et al., More and More Teens on Cell Phones, PEW INTERNET AND
AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, Aug. 19, 2009, available at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/
1315/teens-use-of-cell-phones.

http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjcl/vol17/iss1/2
DOI: doi:10.15779/Z38P34Q

2

Vorenberg: Indecent Exposure: Do Warrantless Searches of a Student's Cell Ph
VORENBERG	
  (62-‐96)	
  

64	
  

	
  

SPRING	
  2012	
  

BERKELEY	
  JOURNAL	
  OF	
  CRIMINAL	
  LAW	
  

[Vol.	
  17:1 	
  

private family or medical issues, or embarrassing text messages with
friends that have nothing to do with criminal activity. The cell phone—
practically an appendage of most teenagers these days—is an extension
of a teenager’s life and its contents reflect a great deal about them.8
Teens appear willing to capture in their phone’s text or photos
their most private world. The ease with which that information can be
uploaded to the internet (typically Facebook) might create an assumption
that teens do not care about maintaining their privacy. However, the
opposite is true. Teenagers are willing to share private information with
their peers in text messages and place private data on their phones
precisely because they expect them to remain private, or at least confined
to a known world of friends and other contacts.9 When school
administrators look at a student’s texts or other cell phone information,
they open a door into the student’s private life.
In this article, I argue that school administrator searches of a
student’s cell phone should require a warrant, unless there are urgent
circumstances involving safety. Students who attend a public school
come within the privacy protections of the Fourth Amendment.10 How
far those protections should go necessitates examining a student’s
subjective view of what is private given their “adolescent vulnerability.”11
In Safford v. Redding, the U.S. Supreme Court held a strip search of a
student unlawful, in part because school childrens’ unique subjective
view of their own privacy should be afforded special consideration. This
same unique perspective should be applied to the contents of a student’s
cell phone. Because “tweens” and teenagers in particular place so much
private information on their phones, their expectation of privacy in their
phones should be accorded substantial protection.
Given that the vast majority of children in the United States
attend public school (about ninety percent), most school administrators
are bound by constitutional rules. Absent urgent safety concerns, school
policies that allow warrantless searches of cell phones violate the Fourth
Amendment privacy interests of students. After all, cell phones in and of
themselves are not dangerous. They cannot hold drugs or weapons—
8

Amanda Lenhart et al., Teens and Mobile Phones: Text Messaging Explodes as Teens
Embrace It as the Centerpiece of Their Communication Strategies with Friends, PEW
INTERNET, Apr. 20, 2010, available at http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/
Reports/2010/PIP-Teens-and-Mobile-2010-with-topline.pdf.
9 Mary Graw Leary, Reasonable Expectation of Privacy for Youth in a Digital Age, 80
MISS. L. J. 1033, 1043 (2011).
10 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333 (1985).
11
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No.1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2641 (2009).
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only information about drugs or weapons. Given that a cell phone
contains highly private information, poses no imminent danger, and its
contents can be preserved while a warrant is obtained, school officials
should be required to get a warrant unless there are exigent
circumstances such as an immediate, apparent threat to student safety.
In the first part of this article, I explain the governing law on
school searches and examine how a student’s expectation of privacy
should be measured. Second, I explain the reasoning for requiring a
warrant to search a student’s cell phone. Finally, I suggest guidelines for
cell phone searches in school.
I. FOURTH	
  AMENDMENT	
  RIGHTS	
  IN	
  THE	
  SCHOOL	
  CONTEXT	
  
Although students may carry a backpack to school loaded with
books, notebooks, and other items, many will deposit these belongings in
their lockers. However, there is one item most students will keep with
them at all times—their cell phone. It is hard to overestimate the
importance of the cell phone in modern teen culture. It has become the
essential communication device and is consulted with mind-numbing
frequency.12
Like their adult counterparts, students are protected from
unreasonable searches, and thus, assuming that the school official’s
conduct is a “search,” any Fourth Amendment inquiry turns on whether
a search is reasonable or unreasonable.13 Unlike adults however, students
in school enjoy less protection of their privacy because a student’s right
to privacy in his or her belongings has been deemed secondary to
concerns for students’ overall safety and well-being. Schools act in place
of a parent—or, “in loco parentis.” Thus, “reasonableness” has a distinct
definition for students in a school setting. Before a school official can
search a student, the justification for the search must be “reasonable at
its inception” and “reasonable in scope.”14 Most courts will give school
officials wide latitude in what is “reasonable,” given the realities of
keeping schools safe. School administrators can search lockers,
backpacks, pocketbooks, and other items of personal property with only
a moderate degree of suspicion—something more than a hunch, but less
than what would be required to meet a “preponderance of evidence”
standard.15
12

Lenhart, supra note 8, at 82-84.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
14 Id. at 341-42
15 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2647; Commonwealth v. Cass, 709 A.2d 350, 357 (Pa. 1998)
(expectation of privacy in locker is minimal).
13
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The more intrusive the search, the more suspicion needed—and
thus searches fall along a spectrum of intrusiveness.16 Searches of lockers
and backpacks fall close to one end of the spectrum because the level of
intrusion on the student is low and thus less suspicion is needed.17 Strip
searches fall on the opposite end of the spectrum and require the greatest
degree of suspicion. Because searching a student’s body places the
student in an embarrassing and exposed position, administrators must
have individualized suspicion of the student’s wrongdoing and an
indication of potential danger posed by the object of the search.18
In New Jersey v. T.L.O., respondent, a fourteen-year-old high
school freshman, was caught smoking in the bathroom along with her
classmate in violation of school policy.19 When brought before the
principal, the classmate admitted her infraction but T.L.O. maintained
her innocence and said she did not smoke cigarettes.20 The principal
demanded to see T.L.O.’s purse, opened the purse, and found a pack of
cigarettes.21 As he retrieved the cigarettes, the principal noticed some
rolling papers.22 Aware that students who smoke marijuana customarily
use rolling papers, the principal suspected that searching further would
reveal evidence of drug use.23 Indeed, a thorough search of the purse
revealed some marijuana.24
Having found the drugs, the principal went further and opened a
zippered compartment of the purse where he found an index card with
names on it and some letters. Upon examination, the letters revealed
information that suggested the respondent was involved in drug
dealing.25 After being turned over to the police, the respondent confessed
to drug dealing and was subsequently charged as a juvenile. The charges
were based on the evidence found by the principal and the respondent’s
confession.26 T.L.O. claimed that she had been unlawfully searched and
16

Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2643.
See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 (“[A] search will be permissible in its scope when the
measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not
excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the
infraction.”).
18 See Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2643.
19 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 328 (1985).
26 Id. at 329.
17
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her confession was thus tainted by the bad search; consequently, the
respondent moved to suppress the evidence and her confession.27
Though holding that the Fourth Amendment applies in a public
school setting, the Court concluded that the principal’s actions had not
violated T.L.O.’s Fourth Amendment rights.28 The principal’s search of
T.L.O.’s purse was reasonable because he had received a report of her
smoking in the lavatory and her denials provided a sufficient basis to
examine the contents of her purse.29 The discovery of the rolling papers,
the Court held, gave rise to further suspicion that the girl was a dealer
and justified the principal opening and reading the letters that showed
T.L.O.’s involvement in drug dealing.30 The rolling papers gave the
principal reasonable, individualized suspicion to look further into the
purse and the search was thus reasonable under the circumstances.31
The T.L.O. opinion was consistent with the Court’s move away
from a strict in loco parentis justification in school cases involving student’s
constitutional rights. Before T.L.O., the Court had acknowledged that the
compulsory nature of a publicly mandated education diminishes the
concept of in loco parentis and therefore students have First Amendment
rights and school officials are subject to the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.32 In T.L.O., the Court fashioned a balancing
27

Id.
Id. at 332-33.
29 Id. at 345.
30 Id. at 347.
31 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 347 (1985).
32 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (student’s right to due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969) (student’s right to free speech under the First Amendment). Arguably, the in loco
parentis characterization is skewed. School administrators’ concern for a child’s welfare
lacks the basic nurturing and protective instinct that a parent’s concern has, and instead
carries with it the more authoritarian role of guardian. See William Buss, The Fourth
Amendment and Searches in Public Schools, 59 IOWA L. REV. 739, 768 (1974): “One of
the things that makes in loco parentis such an erroneous phrase in this context is
precisely the absence of a genuinely parental protective concern for the student who is
threatened with the school’s power. It is presumably a characteristic of the use of
parental force against a child that the force is tempered by understanding and love based
on a close, intimate, and permanent child-parent relationship. What so many of the
courts persist in talking about as a parental relationship between school and student is
really a law enforcement relationship in which the general student society is protected
from the harms of anti-social conduct.” Moreover, the compulsory nature of school
attendance further undermines the in loco parentis characterization. See Anne Proffitt
Dupree, Should Students Have Constitutional Rights? Keeping Order in the Public Schools,
65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 49, 72 (1996):“Commentators and Courts alike have criticized
28
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test based on a threshold of reasonableness—not unlike Fourth
Amendment analysis outside the school context.33 The search, the Court
held, must be conducted in a reasonable manner insofar as the measures
applied reasonably relate to the objectives of the search and are not
overly intrusive in light of the student’s circumstances.34 School searches
must therefore meet a two-part test. First, the search must be justified at
its inception.35 Second, the search must reasonably relate in scope to the
circumstances that justified the search in the first place.36 The T.L.O.
two-part test requires balancing the type of item searched, the nature of
the infraction, and the quality of the suspicion.37 A deficiency in one of
these can be made up by the heightened quality of another. Courts,
including the Supreme Court, have been using the T.L.O. test with
varying degrees of consistency ever since the case was decided.38
While T.L.O. was a case in which individualized suspicion of a
particular student justified the search, there are a number of cases where
the search was premised on general concerns.39 School-wide searches of
lockers and backpacks are increasingly routine in public schools, as is
random drug testing.40 These searches are not targeted at any one
the concept of parental delegation of authority in a system of compulsory education in
which neither parent nor child has any choice in whether to attend school. The criticism
focused on the source of the school power: ‘Under a system of compulsory education, a
school authority is the agent of the governmental branch charged with carrying out the
law.’” (internal citation omitted).
The U.S. Supreme Court, as early as 1966, acknowledged that the parens patriae theory
was not serving its purpose. Referring to Washington, D.C.’s juvenile court system,
Justice Fortas wrote: “There is much evidence that some juvenile courts, including that
of the District of Columbia, lack the personnel, facilities and techniques to perform
adequately as representatives of the State in a parens patriae capacity, at least with respect
to children charged with law violation. There is evidence, in fact, that there may be
grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets
neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative
treatment postulated for children.” Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
33 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 335, 337.
34 Id. at 342.
35 Id. at 341.
36 Id.
37 See id. at 345-47.
38 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No.1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2643-44 (2009).
39 Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton 47J, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
40 Todd v. Rush Cnty. Sch., 133 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 1998) (testing students involved in
extracurricular activities for drugs); Thompson v. Carthage Sch. Dist., 87 F.3d 979 (8th
Cir. 1996) (using metal detector to search for weapons on sixth- through twelfth-grade
males); Schaill ex rel. Kross v. Tippecanoe Cnty. Sch. Dist., 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir.
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individual, but instead seek to root out contraband by searching all
students. Increased drug use, violence, or other unauthorized conduct
usually prompts the search.41 The Court has issued a broad test to justify
general searches. School administrators must have a basis similar to that
for a particularized search, but must additionally show the presence of a
“compelling governmental interest” in deterring drug use or demonstrate
an “interest that appears important enough to justify the particular search at
hand, in light of other factors that show the search to be relatively
intrusive upon a genuine expectation of privacy.”42
Although this article’s focus is on searches of individual students,
the rationale for allowing generalized searches bears discussion because
that same rationale has justified searches that include random urine
testing. Such a search might seem intrusive, but the Supreme Court
characterizes it as an insignificant intrusion with respect to a student’s
privacy.43
In 1989, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of suspicionless
random drug testing of adults after government employers began to
institute random drug testing for workers.44 When schools began to
institute random drug testing on minors as a safety and prevention
program in the mid-nineties, the Supreme Court weighed in on the
practice. In Vernonia School District v. Acton, the Supreme Court upheld
mandatory random drug testing for student athletes. Noting that the
factors permitting a lawful search in T.L.O. were not exactly applicable to
1988) (testing students involved in extracurricular activities for drugs); In re Dengg,
724 N.E.2d 1255 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (conducting school-wide search for illicit
contraband using drug-sniffing police canines); In re Latasha W., 60 Cal. App. 4th
1524 (1998) (instituting random metal detector searches for weapons on campus); In re
F.B., 658 A.2d 1378 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (conducting metal detector scans and bag
searches of students for weapons); People v. Dukes, 580 N.Y.S.2d 850 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
1992) (searching students entering campus for weapons using metal detectors).
41 See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 649.
42 Id. at 661.
43 Although students do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate,
“students within the school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy than
members of the population generally.” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). See also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985).
44 See Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989)
(holding that suspicionless drug testing for government employees applying for
promotion to positions involving interdiction of illegal drugs or requiring them to carry
firearms was reasonable, on balance, under Fourth Amendment); see also Skinner v. Ry
Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (finding suspicionless drug and alcohol
testing for Federal Railway Administration employees constitutional under Fourth
Amendment).
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circumstances involving a generalized search, the Court allowed for a
“reasonableness” standard even in the absence of any individualized
suspicion.45 In Vernonia School District, the drug testing was prompted by
concerns that student athletes were highly involved in the school’s drug
culture.46 The Court articulated a new test loosening the requirement of
individualized suspicion where governmental interests outweigh the level
of intrusion. The Court set out three factors to consider in applying the
balancing test: 1) the nature of the privacy interest upon which the search
at issue intrudes; 2) the character of the intrusion; and 3) the nature and
immediacy of the governmental concern and the efficacy of the means
utilized to address that concern.47
In Board of Education of Independent School District v. Earls, the
Supreme Court upheld a school board mandate that required all students
participating in extracurricular activities to submit to random drug
testing.48 The method of urine collection was not deemed to be a
particularly intrusive exercise because the school monitor waited outside
the bathroom stall listening for normal sounds of urination. Further, the
results of the tests were used for only limited purposes.49 Although in
Earls the Court discussed the other prongs of the Vernonia School District
three-part test, the compelling governmental interest factor was the most
influential in the Court’s analysis.50 The Court cited statistics relating to
drug abuse in schools nationally and gave that data as much weight as the
testimony regarding the school’s problem (which was described as “not
major”).51
Whether a search is based on individualized or generalized
suspicion, it is always evaluated within the unique context of a student’s
privacy interests and the school’s need to maintain order and discipline,
along with a school’s responsibility for the safety of its students.52 In

45

Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton 47J, 515 U.S. 646, 653-53 (1995).
Id. at 649.
47 Id. at 656-60.
48 Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 826-28 (2002).
49 Results were not placed in students’ files and once they had a positive test, there were
still given several chances before they were taken out of the activity. Id. at 832-34.
50 Id. at 834-36.
51 Id. at 843 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
52 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No.1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2009); Earls,
536 U.S. at 830; Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton 47J, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995) (“The
reasonableness inquiry cannot disregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility
for children.”).
46
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either case, the degree of suspicion must increase substantially to justify
searches that are more personally intrusive.
Returning for a moment to the image of the public school child
entering school wearing a coat and carrying her backpack, her zone of
expected privacy becomes greater the closer the item is to her body.
Thus, a student’s privacy interest in her locker is minimal.53 To begin
with, lockers are school property, and school districts often have policies
that specifically state that a student has no privacy interest in his or her
locker.54 To the extent that lockers are repositories for private items like
purses or jackets, courts recognize a student’s heightened expectation of
privacy concerning those items, as opposed to the locker itself.55 Such
items are recognized as more private and thus more individualized
suspicion is required prior to a search.56
Pockets, backpacks, and purses—items that are part of a
student’s clothing or carried by students—are subject to stiffer guidelines
in terms of a search.57 Where school administrators have specific
information regarding a student’s possession or use of drugs or weapons,
a search of their pockets, backpacks, or purses is likely permissible.58 On
the other hand, an anonymous tip or rumor is likely insufficient for a
search of a student’s personal belongings or pockets because the
information prompting the search lacks the level of particularization that
would warrant an intrusion of belongings being worn or carried by the
student.59 For example, in a Pennsylvania case, a vice principal’s search of
a student’s purse that was based on anonymous tips of her possible
possession of a marijuana pipe was held unlawful.60
However, even in cases where the source of information is
anonymous, if the tip includes information about weapon possession,
dangerous drug distribution, or other facts that pose a risk to student and
53

Commonwealth v. Cass, 709 A.2d 350, 357 (Pa. 1998).
State v. Jones, 666 N.W.2d 142, 147 (Iowa 2003); see In re Patrick Y., 746 A.2d 405,
414 (Md. 2000); see also Shoemaker v. State, 971 S.W.2d 178, 182 (Tex. App. 1998);
In re Isiah B., 500 N.W.2d 637, 641 (Wis. 1993) (where school policies specifically
disclaimed students’ privacy right for the contents of their lockers).
55 Jones, 666 N.W.2d at 148.
56 In re Adam, 697 N.E.2d 1100, 1108 (Ohio 1997).
57 In re J.N.Y., 931 A.2d 685 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
58 See, e.g., State v. Drake, 139 N.H. 662, 667 (1995) (pockets and backpacks); Matter
of Gregory M., 627 N.E.2d 500, 582 (N.Y. 1993) (backpacks).
59 In re J.N.Y., 931 A.2d at 688-89; see also Texas v. K.C.B., 141 S.W.3d 303, 309
(2004) (finding that the possible presence of drugs on a student does not warrant
searching a student’s undergarments when the suspicion is based on an anonymous tip).
60 In re J.N.Y., 931 A.2d at 689.
54
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faculty safety, courts are likely to uphold the search.61 Despite the
increased intrusiveness, the court will tip the balance in favor of the
school’s interest in promoting and protecting a safe environment for
school children.62
If a student’s lack of expected privacy in a locker is at one end of
the spectrum, searches that involve the body are at the opposite end.
Searches by school administrators that expose a student’s body require a
high degree of particularized suspicion.63 The one notable exception
involves searches of students engaged in athletics or co-curricular
activities who are allowed somewhat less privacy than other students.64 In
Vernonia School District, the Supreme Court upheld the urine testing of
student athletes, partly because those students were said to be
accustomed to a certain degree of exposure because they “suited up” in
the locker room, and followed rules that required physical exams.65
Seven year later, in Earls, the Supreme Court seemed to cast aside
its “athletes are different” reasoning when it expanded authorization for
suspicionless drug testing to all students involved in co-curricular
activities.66 Claiming that their decision in Vernonia School District did not
rely heavily on the fact that athletes are subject to decreased privacy, the
Court in Earls found that students involved in any extracurricular activity
were subject to communal undress and “off-campus travel” and
therefore, their expectation of privacy was limited.67 In both Vernonia
School District and Earls, the Court found that the level of intrusion (a
monitor in a bathroom listening for the sounds of normal urination) was
61

Thomson v. Carthage Sch. Dist., 87 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2004) (weapon
possession); In re Cody S., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 653, 655-56 (Ct. App. 2004) (weapon
possession); In re Boykin, 237 N.E.2d 460 (Ill. 1968) (weapon possession).
62 See, e.g., In re Cody S., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 655-56.
63 Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton 47J, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995); see also Phanuef v.
Fraikin, 448 F.3d 591, 597 (2d Cir. 2006) (unreasonable strip search of student’s under
garments for marijuana); Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 598, 605 (6th
Cir. 2005) (unlawful strip search of male and female students for stolen money);
Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 116-17 (3d Cir. 2000) (blood test and urinalysis for
suspected drug use); Jenkins ex rel. Hall v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821,
824 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (strip search for suspected theft); Cornfield ex rel. Lewis
v. Consol. High Sch. Dist., 991 F.2d 1316, 1320-21 (7th Cir. 1993) (strip search for
suspected drug sales); Williams ex rel. Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 884 (6th
Cir. 1991) (search of student’s person for suspected drug use).
64 Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 831-32 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 657.
65 Earls, 536 U.S. at 831-32.
66 Id. at 831.
67 Id. at 832.
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minimal and the governmental interest high.68 In fact, the Court in Earls
seemed to back away entirely from any requirement of a real
governmental interest, holding that a “demonstrated problem of drug
abuse . . . [is] not in all cases necessary to the validity of a testing
regime.”69 Instead, the Court allowed for a showing that simply “shores
up”—a standard that appears to be decidedly vague—a special need for a
suspicionless search.70
In its most recent foray into the schoolyard, the Supreme Court
pulled back from its earlier decisions, acknowledging that students have a
privacy zone that must be protected.71 In Safford United School District v.
Redding, the Supreme Court held that a strip search of a student accused
of hiding “contraband” Ibuprofen went too far.72 The student was
suspected of dispersing prescription drugs to other students so
administrators searched her bra and had her open her pants.73 No pills
were found. The Court held that the search at its inception was justified
because the principal had heard that the student was distributing pills to
students.74 However, the scope of the ultimate search was found to be
not reasonably related to the circumstances.75
The Court believed that school officials in Redding had sufficient
suspicion to warrant a search of the young girl’s backpack and outer
clothing. There was ample evidence she had been involved in pill
distribution. The search of her outer clothing and backpack were
therefore not excessively intrusive. However, the Court held that pulling
away the young girl’s underwear went beyond the bounds of an
appropriate search given the circumstances.76 Although the school
officials testified that they did not, in fact, see anything when the girl
pulled away her underwear, the Court held that the very possibility of
exposure was enough to trigger a Fourth Amendment violation.77 What
justified this finding were “subjective and reasonable societal
expectations of personal privacy.”78 The level of intrusion was unrelated
to the reason for the search; that is, the grounds for the search—non68

Id. at 832-34.
Id. at 835.
70 Id.
71 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No.1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2641 (2009).
72 Id. at 2642-43.
73 Id. at 2642.
74 Id. at 2642-43.
75 Id. at 2642.
76 Id.
77 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No.1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2642 (2009).
78 Id. at 2641.
69
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dangerous contraband—did not warrant such an intrusive search.79 The
Court also took issue with the lack of particularized suspicion that the
girl actually had drugs on her person. Without clear information that
drugs were being secreted on the girl’s body or other indication of actual
danger, the Court held the search was inappropriate under the
circumstances.80
The Court acknowledged in Redding that societal norms and
expectations contribute to an assessment of the expectation of privacy.81
Indeed, the Court went so far as to make a distinction between a
student’s exposure in a locker room—something students are
accustomed to and therefore considered less invasive—and exposure for
the sake of a search, which is understood to be more intrusive because it
is not within a student’s ordinary experience.82 In short, the Court found
that adolescents’ perceptions about exposing their bodies and their
vulnerability due to natural self-consciousness demand particular
protection.83
A. Defining	
  What	
  Is	
  “Private”	
  	
  
Permitting school searches that are reasonably related in scope
and not “excessively intrusive in light of age and sex of the student”84
leads to the question—what does “intrusive” in this context mean? In

79

Id.
Id. at 2643.
81
In a very recent case, United States v Jones, the Court held that placing a GPS device
under a suspect’s car without a warrant constituted a search that violates the Fourth
Amendment. Scalia’ s opinion based the violation on the police officer’s physical
intrusion of a protected area—a trespassory intrusion. The Court divided on Scalia’s
approach to the analysis, not the ultimate holding. Scalia did not apply an “expectation
of privacy analysis,” focusing instead on a property analysis. In her concurring opinion,
Justice Sotomayor addressed the privacy analysis and noted that the particular attributes
of the GPS should be taken into account: “I would not assume that all information
voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that
reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.” U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct.
911, 957 (2012).
82 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No.1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2642 (2009). See
generally, Transcript of Oral Argument, Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding,
129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009) (No. 08-479).
83 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2642. See generally, Transcript of Oral Argument, Safford
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009) (No. 08-479).
84
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985).
80
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other words, what is a reasonable expectation of privacy for a high
school student?85
Expectation of privacy analysis measures both an individual’s
subjective view and society’s objective view of what is reasonable.86
Applying the subjective standard to a teenager poses a unique difficultly
because, at least outwardly, a teenager’s definition of what is private is a
moving target.87 If establishing the line for teenagers’ subjective
expectations of privacy were based on the type of information most
teens post online or communicate via cell phone, the line might not exist
at all. However, assuming that the type of private information that a teen
is willing to put out electronically is an indication of what they believe is
private is a mistake.88 One study that compared social media privacy
settings between teens and adults found little variation indicating, as least
85

Bill O. Heder, The Development of Search and Seizure Law in Public School, 1999
B.Y.U. EDUC. & L. J. 71, 81 (1999) (“The test for subjective and socially acceptable
privacy expectations places immense discretionary and interpretive burdens upon the
courts.”).
86 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice
Harlan’s concurrence in Katz has since been adopted as the test applicable to Fourth
Amendment claims.
87 Leary, supra note 9, at 1043-44.
88 See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 404, 406 (1974) (“Because we are accustomed to having something
approaching absolute privacy when we lock our outer doors, we tend to conceive of
privacy as an absolute phenomenon and to denigrate the importance of degrees of
privacy. To us it seems intuitively evident that anything a person does within sight or
hearing of his neighbors or the general public is not private—and that, as to such things,
it makes no difference whether they are observed by a neighbor or a policeman—
because we retire to our homes when we want real privacy. But if you live in a cheap
hotel or in a ghetto flat, your neighbors can hear you breathing quietly even in
temperate weather when it is possible to keep the windows and the doors closed. For the
tenement dweller, the difference between observation by neighbors and visitors who
ordinarily use the common hallways and observation by policemen who come into the
hallways to ‘check up’ or ‘look around’ is the difference between all the privacy that his
condition allows and none. Is that small difference too unimportant to claim fourth
amendment [sic] protection? I myself do not think so, but the difficulty of making
judgments of this sort and embodying them in administrable rules is evident.”); see also
Alice E. Marwick et al., Youth, Privacy and Reputation, 13 (Berkman Ctr. for Internet &
Soc’y, Research Publ’n No. 2010-5, 2010; Harvard Public Law, Working Paper No.
10-29, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=1588163##; Danh Boyd et al., Social Privacy in Networked Publics: Teens’ Attitudes,
Practices, and Strategies, A DECADE IN INTERNET TIME: SYMPOSIUM ON THE
DYNAMICS OF THE INTERNET AND SOCIETY, Sept. 22, 2011, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1925128.
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in this limited study, that teens and adults share similar concerns about
privacy.89
Teens are, by definition and developmental stage, risk-takers.90
Most adolescents do not have the capacity to think through the results of
their actions. Thus, what they choose to put on their phones or publicize
through social media should not serve as any kind of gauge of what they
consider private.91 The exhibitionist tendencies of teens probably have
more to do with social norms and lack of maturity than any kind of
renunciation of what they think should be private. If teenagers are in
some sense unreasonable by nature, it might seem impossible to judge
what is reasonable based on their behavior.
How, then, do we measure a teenager’s subjective expectation of
privacy? In Redding, Justice Souter tried to address this conundrum by
considering the student’s own subjective account of being embarrassed,
humiliated, and frightened after a school administrator instructed the
student to pull out her bra and the elastic on her pants.92 Souter also
applied a “semi-objective” measure, holding that “the reasonableness of
her expectation (required by the Fourth Amendment standard) is
indicated by the consistent experience of other young people similarly
searched, whose adolescent vulnerability intensifies the patent intrusiveness of the
exposure.”93 This standard suggests the need to take into account the level
of intrusiveness as it feels to a typical adolescent, rather than to a
“reasonable” person.94 By this reasoning, establishing how intrusive a cell
89

Researchers conducting a study for the Pew Research Center’s Internet and American
Life Project compared privacy settings on social media sites of teens and adults. The
study demonstrated no significant variation in the settings of teens and their adult
counterparts. Available at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2012/
PIP_Privacy_management_on_social_media_sites_022412.pdf.
90 In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court held that the death penalty as applied to
juveniles under eighteen is cruel and unusual punishment. 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
The Court based its ruling, in part, on research showing the immature, impulsive, and
poor decision-making skills of adolescents. Id.
91 Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., How Different Are Young Adults from Older Adults When it
Comes to Information Privacy Attitudes and Policies? (Apr. 14, 2019),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1589864. This study collected and compared data from several
age groups, the youngest of which was eighteen to twenty-four. The report concluded
that young adults may share personal data not because they lack concern for their
privacy, but because sharing their own data is a means of maintaining their social
connections and adhering to social norms.
92 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No.1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2641 (2009).
93 Id. (emphasis added).
94 In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011), the Supreme Court held that a
child-suspect’s age is relevant to whether they are in custody for Miranda purposes. In
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phone search is to a teenager is essential to setting appropriate limits on
those searches.
B. What	
  Do	
  Teens	
  Do	
  with	
  Their	
  Cell	
  Phones?	
  
In 1973, when mobile phones were first invented, they were large
cumbersome devices,95 weighing nearly two-and-a-half pounds.96 Today,
advances in technology have led to cell phones and smart phones that are
tiny,97 contain a wealth of information, and are used as a regular means of
communication, particularly among teenagers.98 Smart phones, in
particular, are a gateway to documents, passwords, Internet sites, and
countless “apps”—all of which are reflections of, or extensions of, the
student’s life.
Research confirms that cell phones are now virtual appendages of
teenagers. In a 2010 study, the Pew Research Center reported on
comprehensive data about text messaging and teens.99 Most teens send
roughly fifty text messages a day, or fifteen hundred texts a month.100
Cell phones have become the primary mode of communication for
people aged twelve to seventeen.101

her opinion, Justice Sotomayor acknowledged that the Miranda analysis is an objective
one that asks whether a “reasonable” person in the suspect’s position would perceive
that he or she was in custody. However, accounting for how a child perceives the
situation is appropriate because what is reasonable to a child may not be reasonable to
an adult. “In fact, in many cases involving juvenile suspects, the custody analysis would
be nonsensical absent some consideration of the suspect’s age. This case is a prime
example. Were the court precluded from taking J. D. B.’s youth into account, it would
be forced to evaluate the circumstances present here through the eyes of a reasonable
person of average years. In other words, how would a reasonable adult understand his
situation, after being removed from a seventh-grade social studies class by a uniformed
school resource officer; being encouraged by his assistant principal to ‘do the right
thing’; and being warned by a police investigator of the prospect of juvenile detention
and separation from his guardian and primary caretaker? To describe such an inquiry is
to demonstrate its absurdity. Neither officers nor courts can reasonably evaluate the
effect of objective circumstances that, by their nature, are specific to children without
accounting for the age of the child subjected to those circumstances.” Id. at 2405.
95 Gerald Goggin, CELL PHONE CULTURE 20 (2006).
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Lenhart, supra note 8.
100 Id. at 31.
101 Id. at 9. (Not surprisingly, “[w]ireless communication has emerged as one of the
fastest diffusing media on the planet,” giving birth to a “mobile youth culture”).
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In the Pew survey, many teens reported that they send text
messages several times a day to exchange information privately and to
have long conversations to discuss personal matters. Nearly threequarters of teens said their texts contain “personal matters.”102 When
asked, teens indicated that the cell phone is a “bonding resource.”103
Teens naturally use their phones for more than just texting and
calling.104 Of the seventy-five percent of teens who own cell phones, the
majority uses their phones to take pictures and share those pictures with
other teens.105 Other uses include playing music, playing games,
exchanging videos, instant messaging, using the Internet, accessing social
network sites, and using email.106
When it comes to using cell phones in schools, about two-thirds
of teens said that they attend a school where they are allowed to have
their phone with them, but are not allowed to use the phone in class.107
Only a quarter said that they attend a school where they are not allowed
to have cell phones at all.108 Of teens that attend schools where
classroom use is forbidden, some teens talked of teachers’ own policies
for keeping cell phone use to a minimum.109 For example, one high
school student described a teacher who collects cell phones at the
beginning of each class and returns them to students when class ends.110
Another student described a teacher who will take a phone from an
offending student and read the message out loud to the entire class.111
II. CURRENT	
   APPLICATION	
   OF	
   FOURTH	
   AMENDMENT	
   TO	
   CELL	
  
PHONES	
  
In general, courts recognize that users have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the content-based information on their cell
phones.112 Cell phones contain a “wealth of private information” such as
102

Id. at 55.
Id.
104 Id. at 5.
105 Lenhart, supra note 8, at 5.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 81.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 82.
110 Id.
111 Lenhart, supra note 8, at 82.
112 Courts distinguish between “content-based” information and “coding” information.
Content-based information consists of the subject matter of communications and stored
data. Coding information consists of identifying or tracking information. See United
States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 577 (5th Cir. 2008); Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating
103
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recent-call lists, emails, text messages, and photographs.113 A cell phone’s
ability to store this large amount of private information “gives users a
reasonable and justifiable expectation of a higher level of privacy in the
information they contain.”114 Because cell phone users typically have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in their phone’s contents, a search
warrant is required for a search unless an exception to the warrant
requirement exists.115 One such exception is the automobile exception,
which allows police to search items inside a car that are within reach of
an unsecured driver.116
When the issue of cell phone searches first arose, lower federal
and state courts often evaluated cell phone searches in reference to either
the “search incident to arrest” or automobile exception to the warrant
requirement. In such instances, courts used the analogy that cell phones
are “closed containers”117 similar to a purse or wallet. For example, in the
2005 case United States v. Cote, the federal district court in Northern
Illinois reasoned that a cell phone is analogous to a wallet or an address
book because it holds similar information.118 Because searches of wallets
and address books had been allowed in past cases under the “incident to
arrest” exception, the Illinois court held, without significant reasoning,
that the same standard should apply to cell phones.119 In a 2007 case,
United States v. Finley, the court upheld, with no reasoning, a search of the

Co., 529 F.3d 892, 905 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259
(5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1299 (D. Fla.
2009); Connecticut v. Boyd, 992 A.2d 1071, 1083 (Conn. 2010); Ohio v. Smith, 920
N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009).
113 Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 1299 (citing Zavala, 541 F.3d at 577).
114 Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 955.
115 Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 1299. Police officers that make a lawful arrest do not
need a warrant to conduct a search incident to that arrest as long as the search is for
evidence of the arrestee’s crime. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); New York
v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
116 Gant, 556 U.S. at 351.
117 Finley, 477 F.3d at 260; United States v. Cote, No. 03CR271, 2005 WL 1323343, at
*6 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2008); United States v. James, No. 1:06CR134 CDP, 2008 WL
1925032, at *4 (E.D. Mo. April 29, 2008); see also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565
(1991) (holding that police may search an automobile and the containers within it where
they have probable cause to believe that evidence or contraband is contained); New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (holding that police may search containers, whether
open or closed, located within arrestee’s reach as a valid search incident to arrest).
118 Cote, 2005 WL 1323343 at *6.
119 Id.; see also United States v. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1993) (explaining that a
wallet and address book are part of a valid search incident to arrest).
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defendant’s cell phone contents because it was pursuant to an arrest.120
Other similar cases offered limited reasoning or no reasoning at all,
instead simply finding that cell phones are containers.121
Other courts have recognized that cell phones are unique
repositories that contain extensive personal information and therefore
require different treatment. In U.S. v. Park, a federal district court in
Northern California held that a search of the defendant’s cell phone went
“far beyond the original rationales for searches incident to arrest.”122 In
this 2007 case, the court also noted that the search was not conducted to
preserve evidence or to ensure officer safety.123 Cell phones, the court
said, are not like pagers or address books; unlike those items, cell phones
store an “immense amount of private information” including “incoming
and outgoing calls, address books, calendars, voice and text messages,
email, video, and pictures.”124 Information contained in modern
electronic storage devices “renders a search of their contents
substantially more intrusive than a search of the contents of a lunchbox
or other tangible object.”125 The court did not explicitly address the cellphone-as-container theory, but it embraced the alternate view that cell
phones are unique instruments whose private contents are such that
searches need to meet the higher standard applicable to a personal
computer.126
Similarly, in Ohio v. Smith, a 2009 case, police searched a
suspected drug dealer’s cell phone after his arrest.127 The court disagreed
120

United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007).
See United States v. Deans, 549 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1094 (D. Minn. 2008) (citing Belton
and Finley to hold that police can search any “container” in a vehicle—and that includes
cell phones); see also United States v. Fierros-Alvarez, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1214 (D.
Kan. 2008) (stating that courts usually will not “suspend general Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence on exceptions to the search warrant requirement simply because the
container is a cellular telephone phone”); Connecticut v. Boyd, 992 A.2d 1071, 108889 (Conn. 2010) (“When the automobile exception applies, police may also search
closed containers located within the automobile . . . even if it’s a cell phone”); James,
2008 WL 1925032 at *4; People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 510 (Cal. 2011) (holding that
police lawfully searched contents of cell phone found on a defendant’s person incident
to arrest because the phone was “immediately associated with the defendant’s person”).
122 No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007).
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.; see also United States v. Valdez, No. 06-CR-336, 2008 WL 360548, at *3 (E.D.
Wis. Feb. 8, 2008).
126 Ohio v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 950 (Ohio 2009).
127 Id.
121
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with the holdings in Finley and other prior Ohio cases when it announced
that cell phones are not closed containers for the purposes of Fourth
Amendment analysis.128 The court reasoned that in Belton the U.S.
Supreme Court defined “container” as “any object capable of holding
another object.”129 Such a definition “implies that the container must
actually have a physical object within it.”130 The Ohio court made the
distinction that, although cell phones may be said to “contain”
information, they do not in fact contain anything physical.131 Treating
them as containers is therefore based merely on a semantic coincidence
and does not recognize their special capabilities as repositories of
personal information. “Even the more basic models of modern cell
phones” are capable of storing an abundance of electronic information
“wholly unlike any physical object found within a closed container.”132
After establishing that cell phones are not containers, the court went on
to promulgate a new standard for cell phone searches incident to arrest:
once police seize a cell phone found during an arrest, they have satisfied
their immediate interest in collecting and preserving evidence. Any
further search of the phone’s highly private contents must only be
conducted with a warrant.133
A. 	
  How	
  Are	
  Courts	
  Ruling	
  on	
  Current	
  Public	
  School	
  
Policies?	
  
While cell phones have certainly increased the speed and ease of
useful communication and coordination, the growing number of school
students who bring phones to school has sparked a variety of problems.
Students may text during class, use their phones to cheat on exams, bully
their peers, arrange illegal drug sales, and conspire to flout school
regulations.134 Even when schools ban cell phones, almost two-thirds of

128

Id. at 954.
Id. (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981)).
130 Id. See United States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531, 534 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (holding that
a pager is a closed container); United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996)
(agreeing with Chan).
131 Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 955.
132 Id. at 954.
133 Id. at 955. Contra Fawdry v. State, No. 1D10–0896, 2011 WL 1815328, *3 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (disagreeing with the Smith court, holding that the digital
information contained in a cell phone fits the description of objects found in a closed
container, albeit in an intangible form).
134 Lenhart, supra note 8, at 1, 5, 9; Zach Miners, One Third of Teens Use Cellphones to
Cheat in School, U.S. NEWS – ON EDUCATION BLOG (June 23, 2009),
129
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students at such “no phone” schools bring them anyway.135
Compounding the problem, parents do not always support school
administrators seeking to control cell phone use. In 2007, for example,
parents of New York City public school students sued the school
department after it banned cell phones at school.136 One basis for the
court’s opinion siding with the schools was that students simply do not
have the maturity or self-control to resist use, and thus enforcement of a
limited use policy would be too difficult.137
Schools often address the problem by instituting confiscation
policies.138 Some schools go further and sanction searches of cell phones
once they are confiscated.139 When such policies exist, courts have
http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/on-education/2009/06/23/one-third-of-teensuse-cellphones-to-cheat-in-school.
135 Id. at 83.
136 Price v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 837 N.Y.S.2d 507 (Sup. Ct. 2007), aff’d 855
N.Y.S.2d 530 (App. Div. 2008).
137 Id. at 519.
138 A typical confiscation policy: “Students are not permitted to use or have a cell phone
in sight upon arrival on campus. Students are allowed to use their cell phone for
reasonable communication purposes in or out of the building after dismissal. If students
are found using a cell phone or if a cell phone is seen or heard during the previously stated
school hours, the cell phone will be confiscated and turned over to the school administration.
For after school activities, the use of such devices shall be at the discretion of the activity
sponsor.” Bedford County Schools, Cell Phone Policy (emphasis added), available at
http://www.bedfordk12tn.com/education/components/scrapbook/default.php?sectio
ndetailid=9452; see also Boston Public Schools, Guide to the Boston Public Schools 51
(2010),
available
at
http://www.bostonpublicschools.org/files/bps_guide_12_
english.pdf; Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Schools, Code of Conduct 9 (2011),
available
at
http://www.cms.k12.nc.us/parents/resources/Documents/CODEOF
CONDUCT2011ENG.pdf; Detroit Public Schools, Rights and Responsibilities of
Students in the Detroit Public Schools 15-16 (2011), available at http://detroitk12.org/
resources/students/codeOfConduct/Student_Code_of_Conduct.pdf.
139 Sharon Salyer, Mukilteo Schools May Check Students’ Cell Phones, HERALDNET, Jan.
24, 2011, available at http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20110124/NEWS01/
701249945; Marlee Ginter, District Ponders Subjecting Students to Cell Phone Search,
KOMO NEWS, Aug. 16, 2010, available at http://www.komonews.com/
news/local/100809309.htm; Katie McVicker, Checking for Sexting: Oak Harbor School
Board Policy Would Let School Officials Search Students’ Cell Phones, WHIDBEY NEWSTIMES, Aug. 16, 2010, available at http://www.pnwlocalnews.com/whidbey/
wnt/news/100655619.html; Tony Marerro, Hernando Schools Students’ Cell Phones Can
Be Searched, Board Says, TAMPA BAY TIMES, May 5, 2010, available at
http://www.tampabay.com/news/education/k12/hernando-schools-students-cellphones-can-be-searched-board-says/1092539; Lanie Barron, Yes, They Can Read Your
Texts, ERNEST W. SEAHOLM HIGHLANDER, Sept. 16, 2008, available at
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authorized searches of confiscated phones where there is reasonable
suspicion of a school rule violation or violation of law.140 However, such
searches are being challenged with greater frequency.141
The courts have responded to the growing number of challenges
to student cell phones searches by applying the T.L.O. two-step
approach: first, examining the justification for the search, and next,
deciding whether the scope of the search was reasonable.142 While courts
are willing to find that the searches are justified in their inception, they
are less willing to allow school officials to search the content of a phone.
For example, in 2006, the federal district court in Pennsylvania took up
the issue in Klump v. Nazareth Area School District. In Klump, a teacher
confiscated a student’s cell phone after it fell out of his pocket, pursuant
to a school policy prohibiting the use or display of cell phones.143 Once it
was taken away, school officials accessed the student’s text messages and
voice mail and called nine numbers listed in the student’s contact list to
see if the students would violate cell phone policy by answering their
phones.144 The school officials also engaged in a text message
conversation with the student’s younger brother.145 At some point a text
was received from the student’s girlfriend that read, “Get me a ***in
tampon”146—an apparent reference to a large marijuana cigarette.147
http://seaholmhighlander.com/community/seaholm-high-school/250-yes-they-can-readyour-texts; Leonard Glenn Crist, Board Passes Cell Phone Policy, SALEMNEWS.NET, June
13, 2008, available at http://www.salemnews.net/page/content.detail/id/502774/Boardpasses-cell-phone-policy.html.
140 Mendoza v. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist., No. H-09-3895, slip op. at 22 (S.D. Tex. Mar.
15, 2011). See also ACLU of California, Hello! Students Have a Right to Privacy in Their
Cell Phones: Indiscriminate Cell Phone Searches Violate Students’ Privacy Rights (Sept.
2011), available at http://www.aclusandiego.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/HE-L-L-O-student-cell-phone-rights.pdf; Authority to Seize Students’ Cell Phones, Op.
Va. Att’y Gen. (Nov. 24, 2010), available at http://www.ag.virginia.gov/
Opinions%20and%20Legal%20Resources/Opinions/2010opns/10-105-Bell.pdf.
141 See, e.g., Mendoza v. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist., No. H-09-3895, slip op. at 22 (S.D.
Tex. Mar. 15, 2011); J.W. v. DeSoto County Sch. Dist., 2:09-CV-00155-MPM, 2010
WL 4394059 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 1, 2010); N.N. v. Tunkahannock Area Sch. Dist., 801
F. Supp. 2d 312 (M.D. Penn. 2011).
142 Bernard James, Safe Schools, Cell Phones, and the Fourth Amendment, NASRO J. OF
SCH. SAFETY, Winter 2009, available at http://law.pepperdine.edu/academics/
faculty/publications/James-NASROCellPhoneLaw.pdf.
143 Klump v. Nazareth Area Sch. Dist., 425 F. Supp. 2d 622, 627 (E.D. Penn. 2006).
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 631.
147 Id.
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The student in Klump sued the school claiming violations of state
and federal wiretap laws, invasion of privacy, and Fourth Amendment
violations.148 The school moved to dismiss the claims, countering, among
other things, that it was not subject to a Fourth Amendment claim under
immunity laws that shielded state officials from certain kinds of federal
lawsuits.149
The Klump court denied the school’s motions to dismiss.150
Applying T.L.O.’s two-part test, the court found that seizing the phone
was justified at its inception because the student had violated a school
rule.151 However, school officials were not justified in searching the
contents of the phone, nor was it permissible to use the phone as a tool
to stimulate additional violations of school policy. School officials had no
reason to think that the student was transgressing school policy at the
time of the confiscation.152 The court therefore disallowed the search
because the text about drug activity was not apparent to officials until
after they initiated the search of the phone.153
Similarly, in a 2010 Texas case, Mendoza v. Klein Independent School
District, a teacher confiscated an eighth grader’s phone after observing
her looking at it with some friends.154 Because of the students’ guilty
reactions when they were confronted, the teacher inferred that they were
probably looking at something inappropriate for a school setting.155 The
teacher took the phone, searched through sent text messages, and found
nude photos of the student.156 The student confessed that she had sent
the photos to her boyfriend because he had sent similar photos to her.157
The student was suspended and assigned to a disciplinary program.158 She
subsequently sued the school for violating her Fourth Amendment rights

148

Id.
Klump v. Nazareth Area Sch. Dist., 425 F. Supp. 2d 622, 640 (E.D. Penn. 2006)
(qualified immunity protects public officials from lawsuits brought under the
Constitution unless the conduct violates clearly established rights of which a reasonable
person would have been aware).
150 Id. at 638.
151 Id. at 640.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Mendoza v. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist., No. H-09-3895, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Tex. Mar.
15, 2011).
155 Id. at 3.
156 Id. at 3-4.
157 Id. at 4.
158 Id. at 5-6.
149
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and for intentional infliction of emotional harm.159 Like the Klump
defendant, the school in this case claimed immunity from liability under
state law, thus triggering review of the Fourth Amendment constitutional
claim.160
In Mendoza, the court found that the search was justified at its
inception because the student had claimed she was not using the phone,
but the teacher’s observations suggested otherwise.161 Accordingly, the
teacher was justified in checking to see if the student had violated school
policy by sending a text during school.162 However, the court denied the
school’s motion for summary judgment, holding that a jury could find
that opening the texts on the phone was not reasonably related to the
initial justification for searching the phone.163
By contrast, in J.W. v. DeSoto County School District, a twelve-yearold boy was expelled from school in 2008 for suspected gang activity
after his cell phone, confiscated for in-class use, was found to contain a
picture of a friend holding what turned out to be a BB gun, and other
pictures depicting alleged gang clothing.164 The student sued the
Mississippi school district claiming that he was unlawfully expelled, and
the case came before the court on the issue of whether searching the
phone violated clearly established law, thereby foreclosing the school’s
immunity from suit.165 The court found that the search of the student’s
cell phone was not unlawful because the student had brought it to school
and used it against school rules. These acts diminished the student’s
expectations of privacy.166 The DeSoto court distinguished the case from
Klump, describing the Pennsylvania school’s search as a veritable “fishing
expedition” into the student’s personal life.167 Here, the court said, the
Mississippi school’s actions were “limited” to only looking at the
student’s photos.168 The case was settled in February 2011.169
159

Id. at 7-8.
Mendoza v. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist., No. H-09-3895, slip op. at 8 (S.D. Tex. Mar.
15, 2011); Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 22.0511 (West 2006).
161 Mendoza, slip op. at 22 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2011).
162 Id. at 22-23.
163 Id. at 27.
164 2:09-CV-00155-MPM, 2010 WL 4394059, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 1, 2010).
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. at *5.
168 Id.
169 Press Release, ACLU, Mississippi School District to Clarify Gang Policy as Part of
Settlement of ACLU Lawsuit (Feb. 9, 2011), available at http://www.aclu.org/racialjustice/mississippi-school-district-clarify-gang-policy-part-settlement-aclu-lawsuit.
160
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The ACLU has also taken up the issue of cell phone searches. In
2007, the ACLU stepped into a dispute at a Colorado school district.170
School administrators had been taking cell phones after minor infractions
and then reading the texts—a practice that had been authorized by the
school district’s legal counsel.171 The ACLU argued that the searches
violated state law as well as the Fourth Amendment.172 In response, the
school district agreed to limit its practice and instituted new rules that
require administrators to get student or parental permission before
searching a cell phone unless there is an imminent threat to public
safety.173
The ACLU of California made a similar complaint to a California
school district in 2008 after a school administrator confiscated a
student’s phone while he was talking to his mother.174 The administrator
allegedly accessed three weeks of prior texts messages that included
personal communications with the student’s mother.175 Pursuant to the
ACLU’s action, the school administration agreed that school officials
would not search the text messages of confiscated cell phones unless
they had a reasonable suspicion of a violation of law or school rules. The
new policy also limited the scope of the search to information pertaining
directly to the alleged infraction that led to the seizure of the phone.176
In 2010, the ACLU of Pennsylvania sued a school district after a
school principal scrolled through a student’s phone and found “explicit”
photos, which he turned over to law enforcement.177 The case was settled
170

See Letter from American Civil Liberties Union to Bd. of Educ., Boulder Valley Sch.
Dist. (Oct. 10, 2007) (on file with author), available at http://aclu-co.org/
sites/default/files/BVSD_ACLU_10-10-07.pdf.
171 Id.
172
Id.
173 Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Applauds Boulder Valley School District’s Decision to
Limit Searches of Students’ Cell Phone Text Messages (Apr. 21, 2008), available at
http://aclu-co.org/news/aclu-applauds-boulder-valley-school-district%E2%80%99sdecision-to-limit-searches-of-students%E2%80%99-cell-pho.
174 Letter from American Civil Liberties Union to Linden Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Trs.
(Mar. 3, 2008) (on file with author), available at http://www.aclunc.org/docs/youth/303-08_aclu_ltr_to_linden_school_district.pdf.
175 Id.
176 Press Release, ACLU, School District Changes Its Unconstitutional Cell Phone
Search Policy (Apr. 16, 2008), available at http://www.aclunc.org/cases/other_legal
_advocacy/school_district_changes_its_unconstitutional_cell_phone_search_policy.sht
ml?ht=.
177 Complaint, N.N. v. Tunkhannock Area Sch. Dist., 801 F. Supp. 2d 312 (M.D. Pa. May
20, 2010) (No. 10-CV-01080).
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with the school agreeing to pay the plaintiff $33,000178 and to formulate
better guidelines on cell phone searches.179
As the courts grapple with how to apply the reasonableness test
to searches of student cell phones, schools are struggling to cope with
the implications of widespread cell phone ownership and student use.
Outright bans appear to be of little practical use, as phones can readily be
concealed.180 Confiscation-for-use policies are the norm, but the
circumstances governing how school officials can search confiscated cell
phones and the manner in which they do so are still unsettled. As
previously noted, students do not enjoy the same level of Fourth
Amendment protection as other people, so searches of their cell phones
have fallen into a gray zone that begs for clearer definition. The
increasing pace of student versus school litigation and the more frequent
involvement of the ACLU suggest that some definitive resolution of this
question is not far off.181
III. CELL	
  PHONE	
  SEARCHES	
  SHOULD	
  REQUIRE	
  A	
  SEARCH	
  WARRANT	
  
178

Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Settles Student-Cell-Phone-Search Lawsuit With
Northeast Pennsylvania School District (Sep. 15, 2010), available at
http://www.aclupa.org/pressroom/aclusettlesstudentcellphon.htm.
179 Id.
180 A Pennsylvania school banned students from wearing Uggs to school because they
were secreting cell phones inside the boots instead of following school policy and leaving
the phones in their lockers. PA Middle School Bans Ugg Boots, NEWSY.COM, Jan. 30,
2012, http://www.newsy.com/videos/pa-middle-school-bans-ugg-boots/.
181 Eric, Stevick, Mukilteo Schools OK Rules on Cell Phones, THE DAILY HERALD, Jan.
24, 2011, available at www.heraldnet.com/article/20110125/NEWS01/701259800;
Katie McVicker, ACLU Hits Proposed Oak Harbor High School Cell Phone Policy,
WHIDBEY NEWS TIMES, Aug. 31, 2010, available at http://www.seattlepi.com/
default/article/ACLU-hits-proposed-Oak-Harbor-High-School-cell-887073.php;
Katherine Leal Unmuth, Irving School Board Supports Decision to Search Student's
Cell Phone Text Messages Dallas School District, DALLAS NEWS – IRVING BLOG (Aug.
3, 2010, 8:00 AM), http://irvingblog.dallasnews.com/archives/2010/08/post-7.html;
Lanie Barron, Yes, They Can Read Your Texts, SEAHOLM HIGHLANDER, Sept. 16,
2008,
available
at
http://seaholmhighlander.com/community/seaholm-highschool/250-yes-they-can-read-your-texts; Brenda Pedraza-Vidamour, Schools Can Search
Cell Phones, N EWNAN TIMES HERALD, Sept. 6, 2008, available at http://www.timesherald.com/education/Schools-can-search-cell-phones--541309; Leonard Glenn Crist,
Board Passes Cell Phone Policy, SALEM NEWS, June 13, 2008, available at
http://www.salemnews.net/page/content.detail/id/502774/Board-passes-cell-phonepolicy.html. The Virginia Attorney General issued an advisory opinion on November
24, 2010 stating that “reasonable suspicion” is the applicable standard regarding
whether school officials can search student’s cell phones. Op. Va. Att’y Gen., supra
note 140.
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Most schools appear to adhere to a “reasonable suspicion”
standard with respect to cell phone searches when they suspect that a law
or school policy has been broken. However, it is not always clear what
types of evidence justify reasonable suspicion. For example, if a student
is caught texting in class, that in itself is a violation of school policy and
clearly justifies confiscation, but does the conduct justify a search of the
cell phone? “Reasonable suspicion” is a standard applied by police as
justification for a “Terry” stop—a stop-and-frisk of an individual
suspected of criminal activity.182 In this context, “reasonable suspicion”
means that a “police officer must be able to point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”183 Whether reasonable
suspicion exists will depend on the “totality of the circumstances” and
the officer’s own experience and expertise.184 Courts sanction this lesser
standard because, though circumstances warrant some intrusion given
officer safety or crime prevention concerns, the intrusion to the
individual is correspondingly minimal when compared to a full-blown
arrest or search.185
The problem with applying the “reasonable suspicion” standard
to a student cell phone search is that the level of intrusion is far higher
than the analogous “pat down” or brief seizure of a suspect. As
numerous cases demonsrate, searching a cell phone is likely to uncover
information or images that are highly personal. Adolescents’ lives revolve
around communication. Just as Justice Souter in Redding acknowledged
that a teenage suspect’s sensibilities needed to be taken into account
when contemplating a strip search,186 the same justification can
reasonably be extended to student cell phone searches. Students may feel
that the contents of their cell phones, with all the photos, texts,
appointments and other personal information, are as private to them as
their bodies themselves and should therefore be afforded a high level of
acknowledged privacy.187
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
Id.
184 U.S. v. Caraballo, 595 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2010).
185 Terry, 392 U.S. at 24
186 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No.1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2641 (2009).
187See Christopher Slobogin, Is the Fourth Amendment Relevant in a Technological Age?
(Vanderbilt Public Law, Research Paper No. 10-64, 2011; Vanderbilt Law and
Economics Research Paper No. 10-54, 2011) suggesting that a proportionality principle
should apply to virtual searches whereby the justification for the search is calibrated to
the search’s impact on the affected party), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1734755##.
182
183
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This position is not contrary to the goal of maintaining safety.
Whereas cell phones are not inherently dangerous, they may be used to
further criminal activity or rule-breaking. In this case, evidence of illicit
activity stored on a cell phone is not time-sensitive. While a strip search
might be warranted immediately in order to prevent a student from
disposing of evidence, information on a confiscated cell phone can be
preserved until a warrant is obtained. Tighter restrictions on cell phone
searches would not hamper administrators from performing other
searches if they had reason to believe that a student was involved in
illegal activity; this would remain consistent with a school’s mandate to
assure student safety and wellbeing. Similarly, if a student is suspected of
using a cell phone for cheating or bullying, administrators may confiscate
the cell phone and continue questioning the student. The results of the
investigation may lead to a punitive sanction or, in the case of bullying,
the administrators may seek a warrant.188
Justifying a warrantless cell phone search with a subjective
“reasonable suspicion” standard in the school setting ignores a
fundamental aspect of students and their privacy. Students’ freedoms are
already restricted because they are compelled by law to go to school and
their in-school lives are governed by school regulations.189 Add to the
mix that the majority of students carry cell phones (often at parents’
request),190 and that young people may lack judgment and discretion
concerning what they store in their phones. Given these conditions,
allowing school officials wide latitude to perform searches of cell phones
188 Given that cell phones can be used for conduct like cheating and bullying, one can’t
help but wonder what the true disadvantages are for prohibiting cell phones in school all
together.
189 William G. Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in Public Schools,
59 IOWA L. REV. 739, 773 (1974). In this early analysis of school search and seizure
law, Buss argues for clearer recognition that school administrators should be understood
as acting on behalf of, or in cooperation with, police. Particularly in cases of suspected
criminal violations, Buss suggests that excusing the warrant requirement goes against the
Fourth Amendment. Id.; see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985).
190 Parents in New York actually sued a school district after cell phones were banned
claiming that it was a violation of constitutional rights and that, because they were
unable to reach their children by phone, their safety was being endangered. Jennifer
Medina, Court Upholds School Cellphone Ban, N.Y. TIMES – CITY ROOM BLOG (Apr.
22, 2008, 6:21 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/04/22/court-upholdsschool-cellphone-ban/; see also National School Safety and Security Services Website,
Cell Phones and Text Messaging in Schools, http://www.schoolsecurity.org/
trends/cell_phones.html (parents have lobbied school boards to reverse cell phone bans
based on safety concerns).
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violates fundamental Fourth Amendment principles.191 School
administrators naturally assume authority for younger children under an
in loco parentis paradigm, but the natural parental qualities of tolerance,
understanding, and permanence recede as administrators are faced with
the management of adolescents. While educators may still guide their
older students with care and devotion, the modern high school must
necessarily adopt a law enforcement model to cope with the range of
student misbehavior. Schools have increased security procedures and
staff; metal detectors, school police officers (known as SROs), random
searches of students, and zero tolerance policies are now common in
many public schools. .192 Indeed, in T.L.O., the Supreme Court
recognized that “in carrying out searches and other disciplinary functions
pursuant to such policies, school officials act as representatives of the
State, not merely as surrogates for the parents.”193
A school administrator should therefore not be able to operate
like a magistrate and render decisions on cell phone searches in school.
The purpose of the warrant requirement is to have a “neutral and
detached” magistrate, i.e., a disinterested party, draw reasonable
inferences from evidence to determine if an individual’s Fourth
Amendment protections can be justifiably waived.194 A judicial officer
who reviews a warrant request should be severed and disengaged from
191

This view is not out of line with the Supreme Court’s earlier recognition of student
rights in school. In Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., a case decided well
before T.L.O. or Redding, the Court acknowledged that though students are subject to
a different standard, they must still be viewed as persons under the Constitution.
“School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students in
school as well as out of school are ‘persons’ under our Constitution. They are possessed
of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect
their obligations to the State.” 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
192 Aaron Sussman, Learning in Lockdown: School Police, Race, and the Limits of Law, 59
UCLA. L. REV. 788, 793 (2012); Barry C. Feld, T.L.O. and Redding’s Unanswered
Fourth Amendment Questions: Few Rights and Fewer Remedies, 80 MISS. L.J. 847, 884
(2011) (“In the 1980s, police departments began to assign sworn police officers—
SROs—to schools to combat the scourge of drugs and in the 1990s to provide
heightened security after high-profile school shootings. Local law enforcement agencies
typically assign school resource officers (armed and uniformed police officers) to schools
where they perform traditional law enforcement duties—patrolling campus,
investigating criminal allegations, and dealing with students who violate school rules or
the law.”); see also Randall Beger, Expansion of Police Power in Public Schools and the
Vanishing Rights of Students, 29 SOC. JUST. 119 (2002).
193 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985).
194 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984) (quoting Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)).
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the activities of law enforcement and have the capacity to determine
probable cause.195
Any argument that a school administrator can make a decision as
a neutral and disinterested party is without merit. Assuming that the
school does serve in some capacity as a stand-in for a parent, it is hard to
reconcile that status with someone who is also neutral and
disinterested.196 More to the point, given that school administrators (or
school resource officers) are enforcers charged with finding and
punishing violations, their role could hardly be viewed as neutral.197 The
principal or administrator who authorizes or conducts the search will
likely be the one to impose the sanction on the student. Moreover, the
administrator is tasked with reducing violations, and may even be under
pressure to do so from a school board or parent group.
Requiring warrants to search a student’s cell phone would
admittedly restrict the discretion the Supreme Court has given schools—
a move that might seem ill-advised given concern about in-school crime,
drug use, and violence. However, statistics do not support the contention
that incidences of drugs and violence are increasing in schools.198
195

Shadwick v. Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350-52 (1972).
School officials rendering decisions on the legality of searching one of their students
invokes the same problem recognized by the Supreme Court in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, where the justices held that the New Hampshire Attorney General could
not issue search warrants because he was not neutral and detached. 403 U.S. 443, 450
(1971) (“Without disrespect to the state law enforcement agent here involved, the
whole point of the basic rule so well expressed by Mr. Justice Jackson is that
prosecutors and policemen simply cannot be asked to maintain the requisite neutrality
with regard to their own investigations—the ‘competitive enterprise’ that must rightly
engage their single-minded attention.”).
197 See Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 327 (1979) (Invalidating a search
warrant signed by a Town Justice because “he was not acting as a judicial officer but as
an adjunct law enforcement officer”).
198 According to the Center for Disease Control (CDC): “While shocking and senseless
shootings give the impression of dramatic increases in school-related violence, national
surveys consistently find that school-associated homicides have stayed essentially stable
or even decreased slightly over time. According to the CDC’s School Associated Violent
Death Study, less than 1 percent of all homicides among school-age children happen on
school grounds or on the way to and from school. So the vast majority of students will
never experience lethal violence at school.” CDC Website, School Violence: Data &
Statistics, CDC.GOV (Jan. 4, 2011), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/
youthviolence/schoolviolence/data_stats.html; CDC Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance
System, Trends in the Prevalence of Behaviors that Contribute to Violence on School
Property, National YRBS 1991-2011, available at http://www.cdc.gov/HealthyYouth/
yrbs/pdf/us_violenceschool_trend_yrbs.pdf.
196
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According to the Center for Disease Control, the most recent survey data
(through 2009) shows that drug and tobacco use on school property is
flat and that neither the sale of drugs nor violence is on the increase.199
The decrease is part of an overall decline in both youth and adult crime.
A warrant requirement that allows for an exception in emergency
situations involving the health and safety of students would cover
circumstances where examination of phone messages or data could
prevent imminent harm.
Such an exception is not without ample precedent. The Supreme
Court has carved out numerous exigencies justifying a warrantless
search.200 Underlying these exceptions is an acknowledgment that the
warrant requirement must give way when there is an immediate risk of
physical harm or destruction of evidence. In the school context,
maintaining safety is of paramount concern. Thus, when school
administrators have credible, reliable information that a threat of
imminent harm necessitates ascertaining information from a student’s
cell phone, they should be permitted to search without a warrant.201 But
anything less than such an immediate and particularized threat should
not suffice. If there is no immediate threat, the phone should be
removed from the student’s possession and preserved until a warrant is
obtained. A cell phone and its data can be preserved while authorities
notify the police, who have the option to get a warrant.202
199

See supra note 198; Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance – United States, 2009,
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP., Vol. 59, June 4, 2010, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/ss/ss5905.pdf; National Center for Education Statistics
Website, Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2011, available at
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/crimeindicators/crimeindicators2011/key.asp.
200 Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (upholding exigent circumstances
exception where officers do not create exigency through Fourth Amendment violation);
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (upholding “emergency aid”
exception); U.S. v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976) (upholding “hot pursuit” exception
to prevent imminent destruction of evidence).
201 Requiring a student to provide administrators with his or her password, if one is
needed to access the phone, raises other significant questions that are not addressed
here.
202 Bryan A. Stillwagon, Bringing an End to Warrantless Cell Phone Searches, 45 GA. L.
REV. 1165, 1204 (2008) (noting that, particularly in drug-related arrests, cell phones
are useful but information that links a defendant to cell phone use is precisely the
information that can be used to obtain a warrant). Requiring a warrant for a cell phone
search is supported by the court’s reasoning in Ohio v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio
2009), where the court based its decision, in part, on the fact that the defendant’s cell
phone itself posed no threat to the arresting officer and once the phone was in state
custody, the immediate need to preserve and collect data was satisfied.
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Such a rule may raise questions about what type of harm would
suffice. Are drug purchases rumored to be occurring on school grounds
enough? Or must it be evidence of physical harm like information about
a student who has a weapon and plans to use it in school? Each case
must be evaluated according to the potential danger. School
administrators must be able to distinguish between those searches that
are necessary and those that are seeking more attenuated information.203
Even in emergency situations, searches should still be reasonably related
in scope to the original justification for the search.
There is an obvious contradiction between, on the one hand
limiting school administrators because they lack neutrality, and on the
other hand entrusting them to distinguish the cases where imminent
harm is at stake. However, this is precisely the same balancing act that
police officers are entrusted to perform. The key lies in applying a
standard that tips in favor of privacy protection rather than near-baseless
intrusion.
A search of a cell phone is far more intrusive than the
suspicionless drug-testing regimes authorized by the Supreme Court. In a
random drug test, the student reveals nothing ancillary to the object of
the test. They are simply found to be “clean” or not. However, a
suspicionless search of a cell phone might reveal a broad range of
information—medical, psychiatric, romantic, or otherwise deeply
private—completely unrelated to the school’s interest in monitoring
compliance with school regulations.
IV. PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS	
  
At present, most schools in the United States have cell phone
policies in place.204 These policies typically prohibit any conduct
involving a cell phone that results in students’ distraction from learning.

203

The Supreme Court uses exactly this kind of measure in applying the public safety
exception to the Miranda rule. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658 (1984) (“But
as we have pointed out, we believe that the exception which we recognize today lessens
the necessity of that on-the-scene balancing process. The exception will not be difficult
for police officers to apply because in each case it will be circumscribed by the exigency
which justifies it. We think police officers can and will distinguish almost instinctively
between questions necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the public and
questions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect.”).
204 S. John Obringer & Kent Coffey, Cell Phones in American High Schools: A National
Survey, 33 THE J. OF TECH’Y STUDIES 41 (2007), available at
http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/JOTS/v33/v33n1/obringer.pdf.
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Some schools allow students to have phones outside of class but prohibit
their use inside class. Phones are usually confiscated as a sanction.
The rules as to when an administrator may search a phone should
adhere to a strict standard that protects students’ Fourth Amendment
rights. In September 2011, the ACLU of California issued a report on
privacy and student cell phones. The report suggests a school policy with
a provision limiting searches. The provision states:
Notwithstanding any other school policies on searches in
general, absent reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing with
the device beyond merely possessing it or having it
turned on or out in the open, school district employees
may not search any personal telecommunications device
without the express authorized consent of the student
and the student’s parent or legal guardian.205
This rule does not go far enough because it still allows
administrators to use “reasonable suspicion” of wrongdoing206 as a guide.
Instead, I propose that the policy should read:
Notwithstanding any other school policies on searches in
general, school district employees may search a student’s
telecommunications device only if:
1) There is specific and credible evidence of
imminent, specific harm, and
2) The scope of the search is narrowly tailored to
address the imminent harm, or
3) School district employees have obtained
express, authorized consent of the student and
the student’s parent or legal guardian, or a
warrant.
No policy offers an airtight guarantee that school officials will
correctly identify illicit activity at the expense of searching a student’s
phone. Nonetheless, a policy mandating that school officials articulate
the particular evidentiary basis for searching a cell phone protects the
privacy interests of students.
V. CONCLUSION	
  
New technologies challenge us to adapt legal principles to new
circumstances and social norms.207 Developing appropriate constitutional
205

ACLU of California, supra note 140.
Id.
207 Katherine M. O’Connor, OMG They Searched My Texts: Unraveling the Search and
Seizure of Text Messages, 2010 U. ILL L. REV. 685, 715 (2010) (proposing that text
206
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protections with respect to teenagers is especially challenging because
their own adolescent standards are ill-formed and appear designed to
challenge notions of traditional reasonableness.208 Teenagers’ behavior
should not dictate the limits of their own zone of privacy for precisely
the same reason that young people’s rights are subjugated: because of
their lack of maturity. It is a mistake to conclude that teenagers don’t care
about their privacy based on their choice to share intimate data about
themselves with their friends via digital devices.209
Thus, adults should model appropriate standards of conduct and
uphold our society’s ideals and constitutional safeguards.210 Young
people increasingly blur the boundaries between private and public, and
it does them no good if adults enact policies that further blur those lines.
If we want to teach our students to be more vigilant in maintaining their

messages be analogized to searches under the plain view doctrine and exigency
exception); see also Leary, supra note 9; Matthew Orso, Cellular Phones, Warrantless
Searches, and the New Frontier of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 50 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 183 (2010); Amanda Yellon, The Fourth Amendment’s New Frontier: Judicial
Reasoning Applying the Fourth Amendment to Electronic Communications, 4 J. BUS. &
TECH. L. 411 (2009) (expectation of privacy analysis to emails).
208 Developments in science and brain imaging strongly suggest that the adolescent
brain is developmentally incapable of making adult-like decisions and is, by virtue of its
biological makeup, responsible in part for the poor decisions and risky behavior
associated with teenagers. See Kevin W. Saunders, A Disconnect Between Law and
Neuroscience: Modern Brain Science, Media Influences, and Juvenile Justice, 2005 UTAH L. REV.
695, 712 (2005) (“Children, including teenagers, may simply not be as capable as adults
at inhibiting behavior. There is also evidence that this same lesser development of the
same region of the brain makes it less likely that children will recognize the
consequences of their acts.”).
209 The United States Supreme Court has frequently acknowledged the relative
immaturity of adolescents, or youths, under age eighteen. In Roper v. Simmons, the
Court refused to allow the death penalty for children under eighteen. The opinion takes
note of a youth’s lack of maturity and “an underdeveloped sense of responsibility”—
qualities that often “result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.” 543
U.S. 551, 570 (2005). See also Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (life without parole
for juveniles accused of non-homicide offenses violates the Constitution).
210 Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 854 (2002) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (“When custodial duties are not ascendant,
however, schools’ tutelary obligations to their students require them to ‘teach by
example’ by avoiding symbolic measures that diminish constitutional protections. That
[schools] are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of
Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its
source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes.”); West Va. Bd. of Ed. v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
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privacy, we send the wrong message by breaching the line of privacy
ourselves.211
School administrators are faced with tremendous social pressures
and their need to maintain order should not be underestimated.
Nevertheless, the primary mission of schools is to educate. This mission
would be better served if adults in the school community modeled
respect for student privacy. Requiring administrators to get a warrant to
search the contents of a cell phone balances the legitimate safety
concerns of school administrators with a student’s right to privacy.

211

Not surprisingly, studies now show that older teens and young adults have a keener
idea of keeping personal information private. A recent Pew study found that eighteen to
twenty-nine-year olds have a greater concern about reigning in their private information
than other age groups, vigilantly deleting posts that expose information or images they
do not want to share. Mary Madden & Aaron Smith, Pew Internet, Reputation
Management and Social Media, available at http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/
Reports/2010/PIP_Reputation_Management_with_topline.pdf.
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